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The Revolutionary Transformation of American Merchant Networks:  
Carter & Wadsworth and Their World, 1775-1800 
 
John Barker Church left London in 1775 as a bankrupt failure. He arrived in New 
York the same year under an assumed name: John Carter. Yet within a decade, he was to 
become one of the wealthiest men in the United States, with investments in land, shipping, 
banking, and securities on both sides of the Atlantic.
1
 Carter made his fortune in partnership 
with Jeremiah Wadsworth, the bulk of it contracting for the French and American armies over 
the course of just two years at the end of the War for Independence. Their story is in some 
ways typical of eighteenth-century merchants. They were, for example, utterly dependent on 
personal and kinship networks and relationships of trust with fellow merchants, suppliers, 
creditors, and debtors. They achieved success by leveraging their position in those networks. 
But in the context of the war, Carter and Wadsworth also witnessed—and helped to effect—
an important transformation of American merchant networks and the institutions with which 
they dealt. War, and the wartime construction of the United States, were the crucial factors in 
this transformation. This article not only presents a case study of Wadsworth and Carter's 
entangled careers, but uses them to demonstrate the war's impact on the mercantile ecology 
and the emerging economy of the United States. 
Trade and finance could not occur in the eighteenth century without networks—sets 
of durable, interconnected relationships between groups and individuals with an implicit or 
explicit expectation of mutual, long-term economic benefit.
2
 Theorists, social scientists, and 
historians have paid considerable attention to the role and importance of business networks, 
as well as their complexity, variety, and limitations.
3
 Merchant networks often overlapped 
                                                 
1 Fisher, “Church, John Barker”. 
2 This definition is adapted from the one given in Haggerty, Merely For Money, 164. 
3 Alongside Haggerty, Merely for Money, see e.g., Curto and Molho, eds., Commercial Networks; Hancock, 
“Trouble with Networks;” Rauch, “Business and Social Networks;” Rauch and Casella, eds., Networks and 
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with other forms of durable relationship, such as kinship and shared ethnic or religious 
identity.
4
  They were always embedded in wider social and institutional contexts, and in that 
sense, networks were not purely instrumental. Rather, they were the result of cultural norms 
and practices that were not always consciously business- or profit-oriented. Merchants 
worked to create trust, limit their risks, make and protect their reputations, and fulfil their 
obligations to both individuals and communities.
5
 All these practices supported each other, 
and they also operated to deepen and maintain economic and social ties—a process in which 
women were as crucial as men.
6
 But merchant networks, like societies themselves, were 
dynamic and rarely stable. They were susceptible to crisis, disruption, and change. In the 
midst of such circumstances, some merchants could thrive while others failed. It just so 
happened that, during the early 1780s, Wadsworth and Carter were among the thrivers. 
War between Great Britain and the new American states did more than simply disrupt 
direct trade and flows of credit between the two powers. It defined the atmosphere of 
business and commerce over the course of eight years, and left a changed environment in its 
wake. Historians have struggled to decide whether or not war in general has been detrimental 
to long-term economic development, or indeed whether it was beneficial.
7
 No-one, however, 
denies that it offered some merchants large short-term gains. “War is declared in England,” 
Gerard Beekman wrote at the beginning of the Seven Years' War. “Universal Joy among the 
merchants.”8 It did so in part by generating a new business cycle. Wars meant a spike in 
demand for food and materiel, and an influx of credit and cash to pay for it. Of course, this 
first phase would be followed by one of consolidation and retrenchment with the war's end, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Market; Schulte Beerbühl and Vögele, eds., Spinning the Commercial Web. 
4 See Hall, “Family Structure;” Popp, Entrepreneurial Families; Renzulli et al., “Family Matters.” 
5 Haggerty, Merely for Money, 7 and passim; for a pointed critique of ahistorical assumptions about profit-
seeking market behaviour, see Gervais, “Early Modern Merchant Strategies.” 
6 See Cleary, Elizabeth Murray; Hartigan-O'Connor, Ties that Buy; Zabin, “Women's Trading Networks.” 
7 O'Brien, “Global Warfare and Long-Term Economic Development,” 437. 
8 Beekman to William Edmonds, 29 June 1755, quoted in Matson, Merchants and Empire, 267. 
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when demand and credit dried up. But war also changed the parameters of business in other 
ways, by introducing extraordinary forces of coercion and necessity. The existential nature of 
the War for Independence forced the American Congress to adopt radical fiscal measures and 
create powerful new institutions in order to support the war. 
In their efforts to ensure supplies for American armies, both Congress and the states 
mandated—and frequently intervened in—commissary systems which, in effect, co-opted 
merchants into government service.
9
 These systems relied on existing networks of merchants, 
but they also placed immense pressure on those networks to change and adapt to the military 
situation. Peace-time supply chains did not simply map onto war-time needs. Enormous 
quantities of, for example, flour and pork, had to be assembled at concentrated points at short 
notice. Normal transportation, including the coast-wise water route, could be risky and was 
sometimes impossible. Meanwhile, market conditions were distorted by the presence of one 
or a few large purchasers, often paying on credit that would be worthless if the war was lost. 
Merchants who acted as commissary officers often put their own credit on the line in service 
to their country. But under the commission system, they could potentially amass personal 
fortunes in the course of their duties. In an atmosphere of secrecy, well-placed merchants 
could also make large gains from acting on inside information about campaign plans. Both 
these things made them easy targets for public resentment and gossip, a reputational risk. 
War, in short, exacerbated the dynamics of peace-time merchant networks. It drastically 
heightened both risks and rewards. That made war an engine of commercial inequality. 
The rest of this essay is divided into two parts, which correspond to the two phases of 
the war-generated business cycle, and a coda which traces some of the outcomes of wartime 
transformation through the end of the eighteenth century. The first part gives an account of 
                                                 
9 See Carp, To Starve the Army; Johnson, “Administration.” 
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the construction of Wadsworth and Carter's network, the central role of the wartime 
commissariat, and their acquisition of the French and American army supply contracts. It 
argues that war forced merchant networks to expand and adapt much more rapidly than usual, 
and that this had ramifications for merchants' conduct and their stance towards risk, trust, 
reputation, and obligation. The second part describes the winding up of Wadsworth and 
Carter's wartime business, and their involvement in enterprise and speculation during the 
phase of post-war contraction. It argues that the war's impact went beyond the disruption of 
direct trade and credit links, creating new business networks and transforming the 
institutional context in which business was carried out. This process created novel advantages 
for those who did well during the wartime expansion phase. Finally, the coda outlines the 
shift in merchant experience that followed in the wake of the 1787 Philadelphia Convention, 
arguing that political power—exercised by the new federal government—had a defining 
influence on the new nation's financial markets, merchant networks, and economic future. 
 
Expansion and Disruption 
Compared to Boston and New York, the Connecticut River ports of Middletown and Hartford 
were only minor centres of trade. Vessels capable of crossing the Atlantic did not reach so far 
inland. Instead, Connecticut merchants specialised in two kinds of voyages: coastwise to the 
larger ports of the colonial mainland, and south to the West Indies.
10
 It was in this Caribbean 
trade that Jeremiah Wadsworth began his career, as the captain of a ship owned by his uncle, 
Matthew Talcott. Wadsworth's mother Abigail was the daughter of a former governor of the 
colony, Joseph Talcott; his father was a minister in the First Church of Christ at Hartford; but 
both parents died in Wadsworth's childhood. Brought up with his uncle in Middletown, 
                                                 
10 Martin, “Merchants and Trade,” 1-7. 
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apprenticed in Talcott's counting office, and then at sea, Wadsworth soon used his inheritance 
to enter business for himself in Hartford. When war came in 1775, the thirty-three-year-old 
Wadsworth was firmly embedded in Connecticut society and in its mercantile community.
11
 It 
was the war itself that quickly wrenched him from this comfortable sufficiency into an 
entirely new set of contexts. 
On April 26
th
 1775, a week after Lexington and Concord, Connecticut's assembly 
appointed the governor's son, Joseph Trumbull, as commissary general to the state. He was to 
be assisted by a handful of prominent local merchants, Wadsworth among them. With a Whig 
assembly and governor, Connecticut's response to the events in Massachusetts was rapid. 
Joseph Trumbull set out immediately for Cambridge, where he worked to coordinate supplies 
from his state to feed the militia army converging on Boston. When George Washington rode 
through Hartford en route to take up his command, he stopped to break bread with 
Wadsworth.
12
 By mid-July, the Continental Congress had appointed Trumbull commissary 
general to the Army of the United States. “Trumbull's organization,” one historian records, 
“was so completely in the hands of Connecticut men that criticism of the state developed on 
the grounds that it was prospering unduly from the war.”13 Meanwhile, Wadsworth was 
employed in purchasing wheat and flour not only for the army at Cambridge but also for 
General Philip Schuyler's northern department in Albany. Already his connections were 
widening.  
Over the next two years, as the army moved from Massachusetts to New York and 
then south to New Jersey and Pennsylvania, Wadsworth continued to serve both the state of 
Connecticut and the general commissariat. In 1777 there was an abortive attempt to 
reorganise the commissariat, revoking officers' commissions in favour of salaries, which led 
                                                 
11 Martin, “Merchants and Trade,” 75; Platt, “Jeremiah Wadsworth,” 1-5. 
12 Johnson, “Administration,” 6-10; Platt, “Jeremiah Wadsworth,” 6. 
13 Johnson, “Administration,” 29; see also Buel, Dear Liberty, 57-58; East, Business Enterprise, 80-82. 
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quickly to Trumbull's resignation. His successor, William Buchanan of Maryland, did not 
have a successful tenure, and by March 1778 the commissariat was once again reorganised. 
This time, Wadsworth was to be at its head.
14
 “I dare say Mr Wadsworth might have any 
terms and moddle the plan as he pleased,” Eliphalet Dyer wrote Joseph Trumbull from 
Congress.
15
 The commission system was reinstated. But the new post posed enormous new 
challenges for Wadsworth. He had to take over a sprawling network of purchasers and agents, 
constructed by his predecessors and riddled with competition and political intrigue. In the 
winter just past, Colonel Henry Champion and his son Epaphroditus had driven a herd of 
cattle three hundred miles south from Connecticut to feed the troops at Valley Forge.
16
 But in 
general, it was no longer possible to draw supplies primarily from Wadsworth's home state. 
His role in the war made him a merchant on a continental scale. 
Among the connections Wadsworth formed in this period were two that would prove 
significant in his private business affairs. One was the Rhode Islander Nathanael Greene, 
appointed quartermaster general at the same time Wadsworth became commissary general. 
Between them, the two men controlled the entire provisioning operation for the Continental 
Army. They had more access to information about goods, prices, and transport, more agents 
and contacts, and more authority than anyone in America, perhaps barring the Philadelphia 
mogul and member of the Congressional Secret Committee on Commerce, Robert Morris. It 
was only natural, therefore, for Wadsworth and Greene to go into business together, though 
both men were at pains to keep the matter as discreet as possible.
17
 Their operation was 
fronted by another Connecticut man, Barnabus Deane, the brother of controversial merchant 
and diplomat Silas. When the war was over, Barnabas Deane & Co. would establish a 
                                                 
14 Johnson, “Administration,” 78, 108-109. 
15 Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull, 8 February 1778, in Burnett, ed., Letters, III, 77-79. 
16 George Washington to Henry Champion, 7 February 1778, in Syrett, ed., Papers of Alexander Hamilton, I, 
424;and  see The Day, New London, Ct., 2 July 1976. 
17 Greene, “Letters of Nathanael Greene.” 
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distillery at Hartford, vertically integrating their molasses import business.
18
 The second new 
association of Wadsworth's was with a certain John Chaloner and James White, Philadelphia 
merchants who played a major role in the commissary of the middle department.
19
 Inheriting 
the connection from his predecessors, Wadsworth would continue to use Chaloner and White 
as his Philadelphia agents long after resigning from the commissariat. 
In spite of the commission system, and his information advantage, Wadsworth's stint 
as commissary general was not particularly profitable.
20
 It was an office of public service that 
he seems to have taken seriously, and there is no doubt that the job he had to do was hard. 
Sourcing, purchasing, and transporting perishable produce on bad roads, and in the teeth of 
escalating inflation, left Wadsworth little attention for his own affairs. He also had to 
negotiate with suspicious bosses in Congress and, at the other end, with producers who were 
sometimes all too ready to demand exorbitant prices. Even while a mere deputy in 
Connecticut in 1776, he received such letters as this: “Dear Sir, I have about thirty Barrels of 
Excellent Pork put up in my Store for my Use in the Vessels if you Want it Please of Offer me 
a Great price for it & Will Send it to yr Order.”21 Periodically, the commissariat had powers 
to requisition needed supplies, or price-fixing measures were attempted, but neither of these 
were the norm. Many purchasing officers ended up using their personal credit, which meant 
that ultimately they relied on the commissary general to see them paid by Congress. After 
more than twenty months of this, Wadsworth was at last allowed to step down in December 
1779, on condition that he helped out until a successor had settled in.
22
 
Once he was free from public office, Wadsworth could focus on pursuing enterprises 
                                                 
18 Martin, “Merchants and Trade,” 79. 
19 Johnson, “Administration,” 109, 136. 
20 Platt, “Jeremiah Wadsworth,” 20. 
21 Samuel Olcott to Jeremiah Wadsworth, 23 September 1776, quoted in Martin, “Merchants and Trade,” 77. 
The “vessels” were particularly important because there was a shortage of barrels; Buel, Dear Liberty, 83. 
22 Ibid., 200-201; Johnson, “Administration,” 162; and see Samuel Huntington to Wadsworth, 18 August 1779, 
in Burnett, Letters, IV, 382; and Jesse Root to Wadsworth, 6 October 1779, in ibid., 476. 
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that would actually profit him. But the old West Indies trade was no longer open to him. Even 
if he could secure a shipment in the Caribbean, the sea route was so dangerous that insurance 
and transport costs were astronomical. As commissary general he had had to offer half the 
entire cargo in payment for a shipment of rice from South Carolina.
23
 The only real option 
was to continue purchasing for the army—except that as a private contractor, he could pick 
and choose which jobs he wanted. Thus when news arrived that a substantial French army 
was about to arrive in Rhode Island, Wadsworth positioned himself to assist America's ally. 
He had helped provision the French fleet since 1778 and so had some connection with the 
marine agent, John Holker, who had himself gone into an ambiguous private partnership with 
Robert Morris.
24
 Wadsworth had the backing of both General Washington and Connecticut 
governor Jonathan Trumbull. The French had hard money to pay, as well as equally valuable 
European credit. Finally, Wadsworth must have thought, he stood to do well. 
The problem was that other merchants also flocked to contract with the French, for 
the same reasons. Two partners, James Blakely and Gideon Delano, won the bulk of the 
French business early on by promising speedy delivery on anything General Rochamebeau 
might need. In return, they charged extravagant sums in both specie and bills of exchange, 
rapidly depleting French supplies of the former.
25
 Nor were they the only merchants 
Rochambeau contracted. This is where John Carter enters the story. Soon after arriving in 
America in 1775, Carter had found work as a clerk in Philip Schuyler's northern department, 
on the recommendation of fellow English émigré William Duer. After being appointed by 
Congress to audit the northern army's accounts, Carter found himself in close proximity to 
Schuyler's family. One thing led to another, and on the 23
rd
 July 1777, Carter eloped with 
Schuyler's eldest daughter, Angelica. Momentarily the general was furious, but he soon chose 
                                                 
23 Martin, “Merchants and Trade,” 56. 
24 Buel, In Irons, 27-28; Johnson, “Administration,” 139; Ver Steeg, Robert Morris, 32-34. 
25 Buel, In Irons, 154-55. 
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to accept his daughter's choice.
26
 For Carter, that meant the protection of one of New York's 
wealthiest families, and access to their network. By 1780, he and Angelica were based in 
Newport, Rhode Island. With his high-level contacts, and command of their language, Carter 
was ready for the French when they arrived. 
In August, Carter was supplying oats and corn, as well as “as much Hay as the Vessels 
which load the said Grain will bring on their Decks,” coastwise to Newport from 
Connecticut.
27
 By October, though, he and Wadsworth had come to an agreement.
28
 They 
presented Benoît-Joseph de Tarlé, the French quartermaster, with a proposal to jointly take 
over the supply of the French army.
29
 Moreover, the way they managed to displace Blakely & 
Delano helps reveal the dynamics of the credit networks on which the whole business was 
based. Henry Champion, the Connecticut cattle merchant, was Blakely & Delano's supplier, 
whom they owed money for past orders. Champion, for his part, owed Wadsworth “a number 
of Cattle” on a prior contract. He could not fulfil both orders, so if Wadsworth “insisted on 
payment,” Champion would have to miss his delivery to Blakely & Delano, leaving the 
French in the lurch. “In this situation,” Wadsworth gloated to Governor Trumbull, “they were 
intirely in my Power and their Contract void when I pleased nor was Champion bound to 
them as they had not fulfilled on their part.”30 Controlling the flow of credit was what gave a 
merchant power. Once the battle with their predecessors had been won, Carter & Wadsworth 
exclusively arranged the French army's provisioning.
31
 
Putting together the so-called French Contract involved all the elements of risk, trust, 
reputation, and obligation that characterised eighteenth-century business. Those, like Blakely 
                                                 
26 Humphreys, Catherine Schuyler, 191 
27 Agreement between John Carter and Jonathan Burnham, 25 August 1780, Wadsworth Papers. 
28 Agreement between Carter and Wadsworth, 17 October 1780, ibid; see Platt, “Jeremiah Wadsworth,” 22-23. 
29 Benoît-Joseph to Wadsworth, 12 October 1780, copy, Wadsworth Papers. 
30 Wadsworth to Jonathan Trumbull, 29 October 1780, ibid. 
31 East, Business Enterprise, 89; Platt, “Jeremiah Wadsworth,” 24-25. 
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& Delano and Carter himself, who made early arrangements with the French, were extending 
themselves enormously. Unlike Wadsworth, they had never supplied armies before. The more 
extravagant the claims they made about their own capacity, the more they risked failing to 
fulfil the contract and ruining their own reputations. This is just what happened to Blakely & 
Delano. Looking back on events some years later, the Marquis de Chastellux remembered 
them as “undertakers without fortune, and without character; who promised everything, 
performed nothing, and soon threw our affairs into confusion.”32 By contrast, Wadsworth's 
reputation was solid. His performance as commissary general, especially following 
Buchanan's ill-starred tenure, had endeared him to senior figures in the revolutionary 
command. As the Marquis de Lafayette put it to Washington early on, discussing the purchase 
of clothing for the arriving troops, “The knowledge I have of Clel Wadsworth zeal and 
Activity makes me desirous that he be intrusted with that Business.”33 Moreover, the network 
and credit Wadsworth had built up enabled him to actually accomplish the task. That is why 
Carter agreed to bring Wadsworth in as an equal partner on his existing contracts. 
Obligation was a still more complex question, especially in wartime. Not everyone 
was comfortable with merchants getting rich while others died fighting for independence. 
The system of commissions for commissary officers was, as we have seen, a bone of 
particular contention. It was not expected that merchants working for the army simply be out 
for their own profit. Rather, their position in society obliged them to use their skills and 
connections in support of the war effort.
34
 That is certainly how Wadsworth felt about his 
time as commissary general, but it is also how he framed his involvement in the French 
Contract. He entered the business, he told Governor Trumbull, in “a full belief that it was for 
the good of my country as well as pleasing to your Excellency & Council... I had not done 
                                                 
32 Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in North America, quoted in Platt, “Jeremiah Wadsworth,” 22n2. 
33 Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, 23 July 1780, Founders Online, National Archives. 
34 On merchants' obligations to their communities, see Haggerty, Merely for Money, 150-159. 
11 
 
this merely for the pecuniary advantage to myself,” he went on, “but for the reasons above 
and at the earnest desire of the Commander in Chief of the French Army and other officers of 
Rank & Character.”35 Fulfilling social and moral obligations of this kind could obviously 
improve a merchant's reputation, but there was no straightforward utility-maximising 
calculation at work. As the revolution itself demonstrated, merchants could be men of 
principle too. 
There was, of course, a dark side to how these interlocking factors operated. Normal 
practice for eighteenth-century merchants bore very little resemblance to a transparent and 
open market system. On the contrary, it was characterised by the formation of merchant 
“rings” that aimed to exert complete control over a given type of commodity. “In these 
markets,” writes economic historian Pierre Gervais, “insider trading, buyer and seller cartels, 
price-fixing, speculation, [and] market cornering... were not bugs, they were fixtures.”36 
Wartime conditions exacerbated these tendencies by introducing a few major institutional 
buyers with coercive power and almost-unlimited credit: armies. Merchants who successfully 
positioned themselves within wartime supply networks—those, like Wadsworth & Carter, 
who commanded the credit of an army—could reap huge rewards from this extremely 
unbalanced market. The additional risk and uncertainty imposed by warfare also threatened to 
wipe out merchants operating further down the scale. In this way inequality increased at both 
ends. Things got worse for smaller merchants and better for the most powerful. Wadsworth & 
Carter limited their own risk by taking commissions from contracts arranged between the 
French and other suppliers, rather than making direct contracts themselves.
37
 From this secure 
position, they stood at the pinnacle of the nation's most powerful mercantile network. 
In 1781, as the French and American armies made their dramatic march south to 
                                                 
35 Wadsworth to Jonathan Trumbull, 29 October 1780, Wadsworth Papers. 
36 Gervais, “Early Modern Merchant Strategies,” 24. 
37 See Wadsworth to Trumbull, 29 October 1780, Wadsworth Papers. 
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Yorktown, Robert Morris made an attempt to combine the supply contracts of both armies 
under his own control. Morris had recently been appointed Congress's Superintendent of 
Finance, with a mandate to reduce expenditures and safeguard American credit. The 
Continental currency was so devalued by inflation that on the route south, Morris found 
himself issuing personal bills of credit to secure supplies.
38
 Perhaps he hoped that integration 
with the French commissariat would give him access to French credit. In any case, 
Rochambeau refused the proposal, preferring to retain the services of Wadsworth & Carter. 
Wadsworth found the networks he had already forged, including Chaloner & White in 
Philadelphia, proved especially useful with the army in transit southwards. Still, the partners 
could not rely on existing contacts entirely. As ever, the movement of the war forced them to 
continually expand and adapt their network. Carter travelled to Virginia personally to 
organise the French supplies, reporting back to Wadsworth in Hartford.
39
 By the time the war 
was over, the pair had enough Virginia contacts to consider entering the tobacco trade. 
One further anecdote helps demonstrate just how the war concentrated its rewards 
among the winners of the merchant race, while punishing anyone who could not keep up the 
pace. A firm of New Yorkers including Walter Livingston, Comfort Sands, and Carter's old 
friend William Duer, held the contract for supplying the American army as it returned north 
after the success at Yorktown. These were highly-placed merchants who had, in general, done 
well from the war. But the autumn of 1782 found them at the very end of their resources. 
With Continental currency so weak, and nothing coming into the Congressional treasury, they 
could hardly pay their subcontractors, and were fast running out of personal credit to extend. 
Unable to keep up the flow of supplies to the troops, Robert Morris was forced to look 
elsewhere. There was only one firm that could plausibly take over. “A new Contract is made 
                                                 
38 Johnson, “Administration,” 197-201.  
39 See e.g. Carter to Wadsworth, Williamsburg, 3 June 1782, Wadsworth Papers. 
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with Wadsworth & Carter which is disadvantageous,” one Congressman reported. “We pay as 
much for three months as we did before for four months.” Yet, he admitted, Morris “could not 
have done better under the present circumstances, they giving a Credit for the money.”40 The 
war created a winner-takes all system in which those on top could name an even higher price 
when those below them failed. Once again, command of credit was the crucial factor.
41
 
Most buying and selling in eighteenth-century America was done on credit. For 
ordinary consumers, that might mean book credit, where storekeepers would write down what 
they were owed by each customer. Merchants had various forms of credit at their disposal, 
including notes of hand which could be exchanged in future with the original debtor for cash, 
or bills of exchange which would be cashed in with a third party. They could also make 
contractual agreements to pay later, sometimes with interest added. The important point is 
that credit relations relied on the dynamics of risk, trust, reputation, and obligation. If you 
sold something on credit you were taking the risk that you would never be paid. In other 
words, you had to trust your debtor. That trust would be based on his or her reputation, which 
was in part built up over time by fulfilling obligations but also incorporated other measures of 
a merchant's character, including his family and connections.
42
 It was only sensible to extend 
credit when you had a reasonable expectation that your debtor would be able to pay in the 
long run. So powerful merchants with many sources of income and debtors of their own 
could secure much longer credit—i.e. get much deeper into debt—than most other people. 
That, in turn, gave them the flexibility to grow richer and more powerful still. 
War played havoc with these networks of credit by introducing all sorts of added 
uncertainties. Accidents, such as ships being captured by the enemy, upended the best laid 
                                                 
40 Ezra L'Hommedieu to Abraham Yates, 28 October 1782, in Smith, ed., Letters of Delegates, XIX, 315; see 
also Washington to Benoît-Joseph de Tarlé, 7 October 1782, Founders Online, National Archives. 
41 See Ver Steeg, Robert Morris, 310-312; Matson, “Public Vices,” 90. 
42 See especially Ditz, “Secret Selves,” and Muldrew, Economy of Obligation. 
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plans. Formerly reliable suppliers found themselves unable to fulfil contracts; merchants 
suddenly lacked cash on hand and were unable to pay. Currency fluctuation was also a factor, 
because as Congress printed more money to pay for supplies, prices increased leading to 
inflation. When money lost its value, debts as well as prices had to be recalculated. Those 
who could make other forms of payment, like coined metal or bills of exchange to be cashed 
abroad, could significantly increase their purchasing power. Access to hard money could  
improve a merchant's credit, too. It was this concatenation of factors that made Wadsworth & 
Carter two of the richest men in America by the end of the War for Independence. Because 
the French had coin and bills that could be exchanged in Paris, even though they avoided 
using them wherever possible, they could be trusted to meet their obligations in the long run. 
Selling to them on credit, through the agency of Wadsworth & Carter, was a risk worth taking 
at a moment when alternatives were scarce. The partners, in turn, took their cut in the form of 
credit with the French crown—and what could be safer than the credit of a king? 
 
Contraction and Consolidation 
The failure of Livingston, Sands, and Duer's firm to meet the so-called American Contract 
after Yorktown indicates how by 1782 the war-induced business cycle had already reached its 
contractionary phase. Indeed, the United States had reached the extent of its fiscal capacity as 
much as two years earlier, when Continental currency suffered a collapse and mutiny shook 
several regiments of the army. Robert Morris' appointment as Superintendent of Finance, 
placing the power of the purse in the hands of a single individual, had been a desperate 
attempt to maintain Congress's ability to pursue the war. It worked only with the help of 
Morris' personal credit, and more significantly, that of France. As the young aide-de-camp 
Alexander Hamilton pointed out, the French would “never give half the succours to this 
15 
 
Country while Congress holds the reins of administration in their own hands, which they 
would grant, if these were intrusted to individuals of established reputation and conspicuous 
for probity, abilities and fortune.”43 Yet even a loan of $400,000, secured in the summer of 
1781, was not sufficient to restore Congressional fortunes. Morris put half this money to 
work in the establishment of the Bank of North America, but it was nowhere near the capital 
Hamilton had suggested such a bank would need to operate effectively. Financially, Congress 
limped to victory in the war and remained exhausted thereafter. 
Few Americans had capital to invest in the Bank of North America. The two largest 
shareholders by the middle of the decade were Jeremiah Wadsworth and John Carter, who 
held 104 and 98 shares respectively. Morris himself held 95. Between them, Wadsworth and 
Carter owned $80,000 of the bank, 20% of the total capitalisation.
44
 The partners' success in 
the war's expansionary phase had positioned them to reap significant benefits in the years that 
followed. Just as in the case of the American Contract, they were able to take advantage of 
the misfortunes of overextended rivals. In general, the 1780s saw a consolidation of property 
and credit in the hands of the few, which before the end of the decade resulted in severe 
political and social upheaval. Scarcity of money and credit, especially after 1784, left many 
Americans at the mercy of speculators, who bought up debt certificates at vastly depreciated 
rates.
45
 Meanwhile banks like Morris's, the only institutions capable of attracting capital and 
offering credit, tightened their grip on local and regional economies. The banks themselves 
were embedded in new national networks created during the war, networks in which Carter 
and Wadsworth figured prominently. 
News that a peace treaty had been signed arrived up the Delaware River on March 
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23
rd
 1783, provoking joy in Philadelphia. “This inclosed is of such importance,” wrote the 
partners' Philadelpha agent John Chaloner as he sent the news on to Wadsworth in Hartford, 
“that I will not detain [the courier] any longer than to congratulate you thereon and inform 
that Carter is returned to Morris's to get Drunk.”46 But they could not afford to celebrate for 
long. The next day began a whole new era in their partnership. To realise their earnings from 
the French Contract, and reinvest the proceeds, Wadsworth, Carter and their agents 
immediately began to sell the bills of exchange they had received in payment from the 
French. These bills would enable American merchants to purchase goods in France, and with 
American consumers starved of imported goods for the last eight years, they sold quickly and 
near par. Unfortunately, the French treasury was not well prepared to honour its debt. Less 
than a month after the news of the peace, Americans got word that the French bills would be 
stopped for at least a year. When their value in American markets dropped by 20%, 
Wadsworth and Carter decided on a new approach. In late July 1783 they sailed for France to 
negotiate directly with the royal court.
47
 
The trip must have been effective, for soon after they arrived Wadsworth reported to 
an agent in Hartford that “I have seen our Bankers from Paris and find our affairs in a good 
way, but our presence was necessary.”48 However they did it, the partners managed to 
convince the French to fund the bills. Indeed, it was rumoured in the American newspapers 
that “two Gentlemen, late contractors to the French Army, had lately arrived there and made 
great speculations in them and would soon get their money again with a Great Profit.”49 
Perhaps by buying up other people's bills at heavy discounts, the partners were able to 
arrange a deal that brought them a profit while also allowing the treasury to pay off the bills 
                                                 
46 John Chaloner to Jeremiah Wadsworth, 23 March 1783, Wadsworth Papers. 
47  Platt, “Jeremiah Wadsworth,” 35. 
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at less than face value. In any case, by the end of the year they had achieved what they set out 
for. With their wartime profits now realised in Europe, the next step was to put them to work. 
“We are taken measures to vest our Property in America,” Carter wrote to his brother-in-law 
Alexander Hamilton (he had married Angelica's sister Elizabeth Schuyler in 1781), “by 
exporting from here and England a large Quantity of ready money Articles.”50 That seemed to 
be the most profitable way to move their capital from Europe to America. 
The moment Wadsworth & Carter had chosen to invest in imports from Europe did 
not, however, prove to be a propitious one. It coincided not only with a general rush of 
European and especially British merchants into the American market, but also, shortly, with a 
renewed credit crunch that left American buyers once again unable to pay for imported luxury 
goods. The key problem was a shift in British policy, embodied in the  Orders in Council of 
2
nd
 July 1783. These orders cut off all American trade with the British West Indies, which had 
before the war provided Americans with their principal source of remittances to Britain itself. 
Slave plantations in the West Indies needed food products and naval stores that the mainland 
colonies could supply, and they could pay in bills on their British agents that could then be 
used to buy imported British goods. With their sales to the West Indies curtailed by the 
renewed Navigation Acts—though substantial smuggling, of course, continued—American 
merchants found themselves unable to pay for what they had already imported in the first 
months of the peace.
51
 By 1784 the United States was experiencing a commercial 
depression.
52
 Wadsworth & Carter's agents could not shift the champagne, calicoes, and other 
goods the partners had enthusiastically sent over.
53
 
Yet what was a disaster for many American merchants, and even for many British 
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firms engaged in the American trade, was a relatively minor setback for Wadsworth & Carter. 
Unlike most others, they were not importing on credit. While their capital was depleted by 
the losses they incurred from less than successful imports, there was nobody who could seize 
their assets for non-payment of debts. Indeed, the partners were well-positioned to take 
advantage of the credit crunch that resulted from this wave of merchant bankruptcies in early 
1784.
54
 From as early as April 1783, they had had notions of establishing a bank in New York 
that would operate along the same lines as Morris's Bank of North America in Philadelphia. 
With their capital, if not themselves, now transferred back across the Atlantic, the partners 
were in a position by early 1784 to begin putting this scheme into action, with Hamilton as 
their agent on the ground. Rather than investing in risky overseas trade, or untested domestic 
industry, a bank would enable its proprietors to secure a regular return on their capital by 
making loans. In an environment of scarce credit, its cost—and therefore the return for 
creditors—was commensurately higher. Especially if the risks could be limited through legal 
incorporation, banking was the perfect way to consolidate one's gains.
55
 
Before Wadsworth & Carter's banking plans became concrete, events in New York 
overtook them. As the powerful grandee and landowner Robert Livingston set in motion a 
project for a state-chartered land bank, and the city's mercantile community rallied to pre-
empt him, Hamilton was unable to control things as he would have liked. The first-movers' 
advantage had been lost, and it made no sense to set up as competitors to an existing project. 
The whole point was to be able to dominate the credit market; competition between banks 
was largely understood to undermine their utility, at least to their owners. Instead, Hamilton 
now recommended that the partners join in the proposed Bank of New York, the money-bank 
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to be established by the city's commercial interest. Hamilton hoped to “induce them,” he told 
Carter, “to put the business upon such a footing as might enable you with advantage to 
combine your interests with theirs.”56 Hamilton would himself be a director of the new bank, 
and would continue to act as an agent for his brother-in-law. While they would not control the 
bank, the partners would still be able to take a considerable part in its decision-making, and 
its profits.  
“The Establishment of the New York Bank has determined Wadsworth and myself to 
give up all Thoughts of carrying our banking Plan into Execution,” Carter replied to 
Hamilton in May, “but I should be glad to be interested in the Shares of that Bank if they are 
not disposed of, and I shall write Chaloner to employ my monies in his Hands that Way.”57 
By the end of the summer, Carter and Wadsworth between them had bought through their 
agents $15,000 worth of stock in the Bank of New York, which was again around 20% of the 
capitalization in the first year.
58
 Faced with opposing visions, the New York state assembly 
refused to charter either Hamilton's Bank of New York or Livingston's land bank project, 
leaving the latter unaccomplished and the former, though unchartered, the only game in town. 
It would not gain a charter until 1791, but even in the unstable first five years of its existence, 
the Bank of New York yielded semi-annual dividends of 3%—a return of just under 7% per 
year.
59
 Bank of North America dividends, meanwhile, had averaged twice that much per year 
in 1783 and 1784, dropping to a more sustainable 6% in 1785.
60
 
Banks in Philadelphia and New York, along with a third established in Boston in 
1784, created concentrations of capital in the United States that had not existed in the pre-
independence American colonies. Before the war, merchants and entrepreneurs in America 
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had relied on lines of credit from Britain to finance their activities—but these relationships 
had been dislocated by the war, and then again by the wave of bankruptcies that followed the 
short-lived post-war exuberance. American banks went some way to making up this credit 
shortfall. The institutional structure of banks allowed proprietors to spread risk and obligation 
among themselves, and to pool their reputations and networks. State charters, which all three 
banks possessed by 1791, offered an imprimatur that encouraged trust among both investors 
and the consumers of credit. At the same time, banks' internal operations were opaque, and 
lending remained heavily reliant on personal connections. Thus there were two ways that the 
war laid the foundations for the American banking system: it promoted the accumulation of 
large capital sums in the hands of a small group of merchants, and it reshaped and enlarged 
the networks in which they were embedded. By institutionalising both capital and 
relationships, banks helped pave the way for further changes in the generation to come.
61
 
Wadsworth and Carter had no intention, however, of sinking all their capital into 
banking. In 1784, while they were still in Europe, they pursued a deal with the Farmers 
General, a group of French tax-collectors and financiers who held the monopoly right to 
import tobacco to France. Already participants in the tobacco trade following Carter's time in 
Virginia with the army, the partners now sought an exclusive contract, what Carter called a 
“Treaty,” to supply the Farmers General with American tobacco.62 As it happened, they lost 
out on the business to the Robert Morris, who through the agency of Parisian bankers Le 
Couteaulx and Company signed a contract in April 1785.
63
 At that time, Morris was perhaps 
the only American merchant who could rival Wadsworth & Carter. His close connections at 
the heart of the political establishment, as well as networks throughout Europe, gave Morris 
an advantage in securing such business, especially now that he was free from the 
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responsibilities of Superintendent of Finance. For their part, Wadsworth & Carter's failure to 
win the contract signalled the end of their joint investments. Their partnership had been an 
enormously lucrative one, but the business conditions that led to its existence had changed 
dramatically since the war's end. In June 1785, it was formally dissolved, and the two men 
went their separate ways.
64
 
For Carter, the trip to Europe marked a personal turning point. Discharging himself 
from bankruptcy in London in 1783, and returning to the use of his original name, John 
Barker Church, he used his new-found wealth to create a new life for himself in his country 
of birth. With Angelica and his children in tow in 1785, Church returned to London, where 
the family would remain for over a decade. Of course, he retained significant commitments in 
America, including his investments in the Bank of North America and the Bank of New York. 
In the early 1790s, Church partnered with the Philadelphia merchant Tench Coxe in several 
land speculations in Pennsylvania, for which his brother-in-law Alexander Hamilton acted as 
agent.
65
 He loaned money to Robert Morris in 1793 as part of a complex series of land and 
stock deals which eventually resulted in Church taking over the ownership of 100,000 acres 
in New York state.
66
 He also held British government debt, and speculated in French funds 
during the revolution, with the help of the Ambassador to Britain, the Marquis de la Luzerne, 
who had been one of France's ministers in the United States from 1779 to 1784.
67
 In short, 
then, Church remained active as a speculator and financier on both sides of the Atlantic while 
he lived in London, carefully maintaining his connections in the United States. 
Wadsworth returned to Hartford in 1785 and, along side his banking interests, pursued 
a variety of investments in trade and industry. He owned three ships, but with the West Indies 
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trade largely cut off, most of their voyages were coastwise and the profits were low. One 
speculation that did work out well was the export of flaxseed and other goods to Ireland, 
which he had visited during the sojourn in Europe, returning linen and woollens for sale in 
New York. In general, however, Wadsworth's business ventures in the second half of the 
1780s suffered from the same downturn that had afflicted the whole American economy. “I 
have met with so many losses and disappointments that my embarrassments are great,” he 
wrote in 1788.
68
 A major part of the problem was that so many of Wadsworth's debtors were 
themselves in difficulties and unable to pay him. “As I collect nothing on debts,” he told 
Edward Rutledge, “my income is barely sufficient for my own family.”69 On occasion, he had 
to sell bank stock to cover his own obligations. Yet by now it was that stock that provided his 
most stable source of income. As historian David Platt has put it, Wadsworth's “capital... 
remained large. The trouble was that profitable investments were not to be found.”70 
In 1786, Wadsworth travelled south to Philadelphia on behalf of a group of investors 
in the Bank of North America, which included Church and the Dutch envoy to the United 
States, Philip van Berkel. In light of the revocation of the bank's charter by the Pennsylvania 
state assembly, Wadsworth was charged with assessing the viability of their investment. He 
uncovered what he took to be some highly irregular practices among the directors and their 
coterie in Philadelphia, especially the large sums loaned without security to the lawyer and 
some-time bank director James Wilson. “After the unwarrantable lengths they have gone in 
assisting Wilson,” Church wrote to Hamilton from London, “I do not think the property can 
with propriety be confided to their management.”71 Yet the investors did not take their money 
out of the bank immediately—after all, where would they put it?—and by the end of the year 
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a new, pro-bank assembly had been elected which restored the charter within a few months.
72
 
Meanwhile, the conditions for speculation and investment in the United States were about to 
change, as the Philadelphia Convention gave new life to American financial markets. 
 
Power and Politics 
The transformation of American merchant networks was a political as well as an economic 
process. Those who opposed the Bank of North America in Pennsylvania accused it of 
promoting the concentration of power in the hands of a small financial elite. “We fear the 
time is not very distant,” reported a committee of the state legislature, “when the bank will be 
able to dictate to the legislature, what laws to pass and what to forbear.”73 But political power 
shaped financial institutions as much as vice versa. It was only through Congress and the 
French loan that Robert Morris had been able to establish the bank in the first place. War and 
independence created a completely new political context to financial and economic life. In 
order to build a viable fiscal-military state and maintain independence on the world stage, 
American politicians—Alexander Hamilton foremost among them—actively sought to 
construct new financial institutions, and to create a class of national creditors whose interests 
would become entwined with those of the United States.
74
 While Hamilton had many 
political opponents, as Secretary of the Treasury in the new government he had the support of 
George Washington, as well as powerful interests in the mercantile community. By the 
middle of the 1790s, he had created a dramatically new landscape of American finance. 
The first stage of Hamilton's program called for the federal government to assume all 
the war debts of the states, and fund them at face value. By taking on the entire debt, 
Hamilton hoped to establish the credit-worthiness of the new nation, as well as create a 
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moneyed interest in the success—and revenue powers—of the government. Much of the debt 
that had originally been owed in small amounts to soldiers and war-time suppliers had been 
bought up at heavy discounts, over the preceding decade of economic downturn, by those 
who could afford to gamble on the eventual returns. These men would become the nation's 
creditors. The second stage of Hamilton's plan was the creation of a national bank. This 
would facilitate the government's financial transactions, including loans, much as the Bank of 
North America had done for Congress in the early 1780s. It would stimulate investment in 
industry, internal improvements, and foreign trade. And because two thirds of the value of its 
stock was to be paid for in government securities, the bank would also further support the 
value of the public debt. In short, Hamilton aimed to recreate the financial apparatus of the 
British empire. “By contributing to enlarge the mass of industrious and commercial 
enterprise,” he wrote in December 1790,  “banks become the nurseries of national wealth.”75 
Wadsworth, elected to Connecticut's ratifying convention and to the House of 
Representatives under the new federal constitution, was a strong supporter of this program.
76
 
As a holder of substantial sums in government debt, both from his wartime commissary role 
and afterwards as a speculator, Wadsworth had a financial interest in its success. Speculation 
in government debt had already sped up as the new constitution became a reality. Since 
Hamilton's first Report on Public Credit, setting out his plans in January 1790, the intensity 
had redoubled. Wadsworth, with his extensive contacts and capital, was among those best 
prepared to take advantage of the situation. According to one rumour, recorded by 
Pennsylvania senator William Maclay in his diary, “Wadsworth... sent two small vessels for 
the Southern States, on the errand of buying up certificates.”77 Much like the wartime 
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spending boom, the Hamiltonian financial program promised windfalls for well-placed 
merchants and financiers. By rewarding the current owners of securities, and leaving nothing 
for their original holders, it also compounded the inequalities that had been created over the 
course of the wartime business cycle. 
Those involved with the creation of this new financial infrastructure were the same 
men who had worked together to supply and fund the American war effort. The friendships 
and networks formed in those years shaped access to information, power, and wealth in the 
first decade of the new federal government. When the Bank of the United States made its 
initial public offering in July 1791, for example, Wadsworth had to use his connections in the 
Treasury Department to secure his 48 shares.
78 
Cultural and moral attitudes to the relationship 
between personal gain and public service were shifting and ambivalent.
79
 Some saw the use 
of public office for private profit as illegitimate. Others, like Wadsworth and Carter's 
erstwhile friend and competitor William Duer, saw it merely as inconvenient. Duer left a post 
as Hamilton's secretary “to do better” in private speculation, and in 1792 his spectacular 
failure created a short-lived panic in the financial markets.
80
 Such events damaged public 
confidence. As Hamilton's friend Robert Troup put it, “Duer’s total bankruptcy will affect the 
public interest by bringing the funding system into odium.” After all, Troup went on, 
“widows, orphans, merchants mechanicks &c are all concerned in his notes.”81 These were 
the losers when extended credit networks failed. 
By the closing years of the eighteenth century, Americans faced another economic 
downturn, one caused by the combined effect of Quasi-War with France, outbreaks of Yellow 
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Fever in port cities, and the suspension of specie payments by the Bank of England in 1797.
82
 
That year, both Robert Morris and James Wilson succumbed to the weight of their obligations 
and faced debtors' prison.
83
 John Barker Church, meanwhile, returning with his family from 
Britain, became a marine insurance underwriter and continued to trade internationally in 
government certificates.
84
 In New York, he and his wife became fixtures of Federalist high 
society. Yet recession also fuelled ideological and partisan division. Among the middling 
sorts and artisans who had begun to flock to the Democratic-Republican party, a certain 
suspicion was cast on those like Church and Wadsworth, “both of whom made great fortunes 
by the war,” and who had helped, it was alleged, to build a Federalist aristocracy. Opposition 
newspapers like Philadelphia's Aurora drew out these connections and held them up for 
public criticism. “Are our sons to fight battles that a certain class of men may reap the spoil,” 
it asked, “or enlarge their power and fortunes upon our destruction?”85 Jefferson's election in 
1800 marked the culmination of this political backlash. 
From the outbreak of the war in 1775, Wadsworth and Church's fortunes had been tied 
to their connections with political power. Wadsworth's friendship with the Trumbull family, 
his appointment as a Connecticut and then federal commissary, and Church's connection with 
the powerful Schuylers and with Hamilton, gave them special access to information, contacts, 
and credit. These crucial advantages made the partners' wartime success possible. Far from 
operating in an open and transparent market, merchants like Wadsworth and Church thrived 
by creating closed circles that could create and exploit monopolistic (or monopsonistic) 
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positions and information asymmetries.
86
 In turn, their ability to command networks of credit 
and supply during the war proved crucial to the logistical operations of the French and 
American armies. When the new federal government after 1789 embarked on the creation of 
a fiscal-military infrastructure, it was to these same merchant-financiers that it turned. The 
relationship between private financial elites and the new-born American state was, in other 
words, a symbiotic one. Neither could have existed without the other. This mutual 
constitution and entanglement is central to both the history of state-formation and the history 
of capitalism. Nor did it disappear with the Jeffersonian victory in 1800.87 It is in this light 
that we might consider the American Revolution an important economic event, as well as a 
political one. 
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